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enable the chemist to sublime it in a tube, or test it in any other
method he may choose to employ.
By this process of Reinsch, two square inches of copper can be
coated distinctly by the one-thousandth of a grain of arsenic. The
practical limit of detection, by this test, has been calculated at one
part in two millions !
It has become a maxim among chemists and jurists, that the
objections to any one test are removed by the successful applica-
tions of others, not open to the same difficulties. This maxim cannot
be to prominent in the mind of an expert, who should thus be pre-
pared to defend one test by the aid of another.
If, in the course of a chemico-legal research, the chemist invaria-
bly ascertains the purity of his re-agents, and his apparatus, by
previous investigation, one great source of error will be avoided.
As .a last precaution, the expert should be prepared to bring into
Court the tubes containing the arsenical rings, and if possible, any
other specimen of the poison which he may have obtained. This
has sometimes been neglected. We believe that in France, it is
considered essential to the evidence. Regnault even directs, that
the pieces of porcelain, etc., with which the apparatus of Marsh is
first tried, should be placed alongside of those stained by the arse-
nic, that he may thus exhibit *as part of the evidence the irreproach-
able character of the agents employed during his researches.
S. W. M.
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Circuit Court of the United States, Bastern District of Pensyzl-
vania. Beptember, 1852.
THE PHIADELPHIA STEAM NAVIGATION CO. v. THE DELAWARE.
PALMER et al. v. THE OSPREY.
1. A steamer on her way to sea at night, with her signal lanterns properly placed,
saw a barque, without Zights, heading up the river to the starboard of her wake.
She accordingly starboarded her helm, to keep off the track of the barque, but the
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* latter, about the same time, unobserved by the steamer, changed her course, by
porting her helm, so that a collision ensued. Held, that as the course and posi-
tion of the steamer could be well understood on the barque, the latter was in
fault, and she was accordingly condemned in damages.
2. Though a sailing vessel is not bound to carry lights at sea, yet if a collision
occurs, occasioned by their absence, the party thus in fault, will be held liable.
Appeal in Admiralty from District Court. Cross libels for col-
lision.
The facts and arguments in -this case, with the opinion of the
Court below, will be found fully reported in 4 Am. L. Jour., N. S.
533, &c.
Mr. St. Geo. T. Campbell and Air. IFm. B. Reed, for Appel-
lants.
Mr. Geo. X. 'Wharton and Mr. Balc , for Appellees.
September 13. The opinion of the Court was delivered by
GRIER, J.
Taking all the other circumstances of these cases together, and
omitting the fact of almost total darkness, and that the barque
could see the steamboat, while the steamboat could not see the
barque, the steamboat would have clearly been held liable for the
damages of the collision. It is true there is no law requiring ves-
sels navigating the high seas after night to carry signal lights, and
I concur with the District Court that it is much to be regretted.
The case before us is briefly this: a steamboat and a sailing vessel
are meeting one another on a very dark night in the Delaware Bay,
six or seven miles within the Capes. The barque has the wind
free. They are approaching each other at the rate of sixteen, or
at the least calculation, fifteen miles an hour, and therefore approxi-
mate in a right line at the rate of a mile in four minutes. The
steamboat has three lights out. The barque-has none. The barque
sees the steamboat approach. Sailing before the wind, she has the
power to give the steamer a wide berth, and obviate all possible
danger of collision. -
Now, if the steamer had the same opportunity of observing the
course of the barque, the latter knowing this fact, would have a
right to expect a consequent caution on the part of the steamer.
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But I think it is plain, from the testimony, that the light shown by
the barque was too late to be of any benefit, or to warn the steamer
of its approach, till the very moment of the collision. The warn-
ing given of the approach of the barque, by her sails intercepting
the light from the light-house, like that of the lamp from the
barque, was also too late, as well as too uncertain, to justify the
steamboat in taking any other means of escaping a collision, than
those she did take. The order to starboard the helm before stop-
ping the boat and reversing her engine, may have been wrong, and
it may be true that these latter orders were not fully executed at
the time of the collision. It may be true also, that the order of
the barque to starboard her helm, and disregard that of the steam-
boat captain to port it, was correct, and the only way of avoiding
a collision which would have destroyed the barque. But these
considerations cannot affect the case. It was the fault of the
barque and not of the steamboat, that the vessels were brought
into such proximity, that such mistakes might be made, in the
dark, when the pilot of the steamboat could neither judge of the
distance between the approximating vessels, the rates of their
approach, or the relative angle of their respective courses. It
was the duty of the barque, which could see, to give a wide berth
to the boat, which could not see, and not to leave it in the power
of the pilot, by a mistake in a moment of surprise, to cause -a
collision.
The rule of passing to the right, or porting the helm, in cases of
vessels meeting on the same line, is founded on the supposition that
each party can see the other. But where one is blind and the
other knows it, he should not put himself within reach of injury,
by any mistake of the blind, or run over him, or knock him down
for not observing the rule.
The Court cannot establish any rule to bind vessels navigating
the high seas after night to carry signal lights; but where one
party does this and the other does not, we can, and will treat (in a
case ewteris paribus) the da k boat as .the wrong-doer, and liable
to make reparation. In rivers and narrow channels, and in har-
2
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bors, there are generally local regulations requiring it. But if
there be not, it would still be advisable for vessels sailing, either in
close, or open channels, to keep proper signal lights on dark nights,
if they expect a remedy in courts, in case of collision.
The decree of the District Court in these cases is therefore
affirmed.
Circuit Court of the United States for the First Circuit.
SYLVANUS HOLBROOK, ET AL. VS. THE AMERICAN INSURANCE
CbMPANY.
Construction of clauses in fire policy respecting subsequent insurance, and termi-
nation of interest.
Meaning of the word "assigns."
A conveyance which equity will treat as a mortgage does not terminate the inter-
est of the assured.
Insurance made by a mortgagee at the expense of the mortgagor, is subsequent
insurance by the mortgagor.
This was an action on a policy of insurance against fire, under-
written by the defendants, in the sum of seventy-five hundred
dollars, on moveable machinery, and stock in a cotton mill. The
destruction of the property by fire being admitted, and the pre-
liminary proof of loss required by the policy having been proved,
the defence turned on two clauses in the policy; which were in the
following words: "and if the said insured or their assigns shall
hereafter make any other insurance on the same property, and
shall not forthwith give notice thereof to this corporation, and
have the same endorsed on this instrument, or otherwise acknow-
ledged by them in writing, this policy shall cease, and be of no
further effect." "The interest of the assured in this policy is not
assignable, unless by consent of this corporation, manifested in
writing, and in case of any transfer or termination of the interest
of the insured in this policy, either by sale, or otherwise, without
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such consent, this policy shall from thenceforth be void and of no
effect."
It appeared that on the 25th of April, 1850, while the policy
was in force, and before the loss, the plaintiffs made a bill of sale
of a large part of the property mentioned in the policy, to Shepard,
Wright & Ripley, of New York, who were the plaintiffs' factors,
and to whom the plaintiffs were indebted, for a balance of account,
in the sum of $20,910; and at the same time and as part of the
same transaction, Shepard, Wright & Ripley executed. an instru-
ment in the following words:
This indenture, made this twenty-fifth day of April, in the year
of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty, by and between
Messrs. Shepard, Wright & Ripley of the city, county and State
of New York, commission merchants of the one part, and Sylvanus
Holbrook & Company, of Northbridge, County of Worcester, and
State of Massachusetts of the other part, Witnesseth,-that the
said Shepard, Wright & Ripley, do hereby lease, demise and let
unto the said Holbrook & Company, all that portion of cotton
machinery which the said Holbrook & Company have sold to said
Shepard, Wright & Ripley, by bill of even date amounting to
the sum of twenty thousand nine hundred and ten dollars, all now
in good running order, placed in the mill now occupied by the said
Holbrook, &c.
To hold for the term of five years from date, the said Lessees
yielding and paying therefor at the office of Messrs. Shepard,
Wright & Ripley, New York, the sum of two thousand one hun-
dred dollars annually, and whenever the 'said Holbrook & Co., or
their representatives, have or do pay the sum of twenty thousand
nine hundred and ten dollars, and interest upon that amount at the
rate of seven per cent. per annum, the said Lessors agree to sell
it to them, and the said Lessors do promise that while the Lessees
and their representatives pay the rent, taxes and insurance, and
keep the same in good repair, they shall peaceably enjoy the same.
The said Lessees promising to pay the rent at the time aforesaid,
and to quit and deliver up the same at the end of the term in as
good order as the same now are.
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In witness whereof the said parties have hereunto set their hands
and seals the day and year above written.
Signed, sealed and delivered
in presence of PHILANDER HALE.
SHEPARD, WRIGHT & RIPLEY, [L. s.]
SYLVANUS HOLBROOK, & Co., [L. S.]
Ripley, one of the firm, testified that the object of the parties
was to give and take security for their balance of account; that
there was no consideration paid by them, and no change was made
in their accounts, or* the mode of keeping them in consequence of
the conveyance. That this firm instructed their agents at Worces-
ter, Massachusetts, to obtain insurances on their interest in the
property, and a policy was obtained at the Howard office in Lowell,
for $5,000, and another for the same sum at another office in Rome,
N. Y. ; that the plaintiffs did not know of the existence of either
of these policies so far as the witness knew or believed. That the
amounts of these policies had been paid to his firm, and carried
into a special account, the name of which he could not recollect,
biit it contained nothing but the premium of the two sums of $5,000
each; and that when they should settle with the plaintiffs the balance
of this account would be passed to their credit. The policy at the
Howard office was produced, and it appeared to h.ve originally
described the insured as mortgagees, but the word had been erased.
In their representation, claim and proof of loss, Shepard, Wright
& Ripley did not treat theirs as a mortgage interest, but as being
the whole property subject to a prior mortgage to a third person.
Some other facts are noticed in the course of the opinion, which
was delivered by
CURTIs, J.-The clause in the policy, which declares the interest
of the insured therein not to be assignable, has no application to this
case, unless the insured, by making such a transfer of the pro-
perty as deprived them of their insurable interest therein, have
worked "a termination of the interest of the insured in this policy"
within the meaning of this clause; and the inquiry is, has there
been such a termination? The first reason why their interest in
the policy is not terminated, is found in the fact, that only a part
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of the property insured was conveyed to Shepard, Wright & Ripley.
The policy continued to cover so much as remained. But at the
same time, if a part of the property insured was sold, it ceased
thereby to be at the risk of the underwriters; and in adjusting the
loss on the residue, the amount thus sold must be treated as if not
put at risk, -and the sum insured reduced proportionably; and as
these plaintiffs claim to recover the whole amount insured in this
policy, it becomes necessary to consider the effect of the convey-
ance they made. It was not a legal mortgage, for that requires
a defeasance, which on performance of the condition would revest
the legal title in the grantors. The indenture contains no such
defeasance. But in equity a conveyance of property by way of
security for a debt is treated as a mortgage, whatever form the
parties may have adopted to effect that object. In this case they
have described, in Words, a conditional sale, with a right of repur-
chase, but as it clearly appears that the sole consideration was a
debt, due from the grantors to the grantees, that the debt was not
extinguished, and that the only object the parties had in view was
to give and take security for that debt, and the interest which
should accrue thereon, the conveyance could not be allowed to
operate otherwise than as a mortgage between the parties. (Bus-
sell v. Southard, et al., 12 Howard, 139.) There remained there-
fore in the plaintiffs the same insurable interest as before; for the
property standing as security only for their debt, the loss to them
by its destruction would be the same as if no such mortgage inter-
est had been created. (Higgonsonv. Dale, 13 Mass. R. 96: Bartlett
v. Walter, 18 Mass. R. 267 ; ordbn v. Mass. F. & H. Insurance
Co., 2 Pick. 249; Lazarus v. Commonwealth Ins. Go., 5 Pick. 76;
S. C. 19 Pick. 81 ; Gibert v. Man. Ins. Go., 23 Wend. 43 ; Swift,
et. al. v. Vermont X. Ins. Go., 18 Vermont R. 304; Whitemore v.
Ins. Co., 20 Vermont R. 546.)
Independent of this clause in the policy, and of other facts
presently to be mentioned, it might have been necessary to submit
to the jury the question, whether this change in the title was
material to, and did work a change in the risk. In the case of the
Columbian Insurance Gompany v. Lawrence, (2 Peters, 151,) the
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Supreme Court held, that the difference between absolute legal title,
and a conditional equitable title, might be material to the risk, and
that it could not be declared, as a legal result, that one was in sub-
stance the same as the other, as a subject of insurance. But in
this case the underwriters inquired, before making the insurance,
whether the property was under mortgage, and for how much, and
to whom, and whether the mortgage had insurance; to these in-
quiries the insured replied in writing, that "the property is mort-
gaged, and the mortgagee has no insurance to our knowledge."
Having. been satisfied with this answer, and content to effect the
policy without knowing the amount of the incumbrance, it would
be difficult for them now to complain of the creation of an incum-
brance on the property, the possession and custody, and sub-
stantive interest of the insured, remaining the same. But however
this might be, I consider this express clause in the policy as govern-
ing the rights of both the parties in this particular. It provides
only for a termination, of the interest*of the insured. Nothing
short of that is to avoid the policy; and I do not think it is open
to insurer to say, that though less than this has occurred, the
policy is void. If it was intended to have a change in the legal
title, which worked no change in the insurable interest, affect the
p6licy, it should have been so declared.
I am of opinion that there is no defence to any part of the claim,
under this clause of the policy.
Under the other clause of the policy, it has been argued that the
word " assigns" means any one who takes an interest in the property
from the insured, and that as Shepard, Wright & Ripley, did take
such an interest, and procured insurance on the property, and no
notice was given to the defendants, this policy ceased and became
void. I do not think this is the meaning of the word " assigns" in
this connection. This policy may be assigned to a purchaser of
the property with the assent of the underwriters. Being thus
owner of the property and the policy, such purchaser would stand
in: place of the insured, and ought to be subjected to the same re-
straint as to subsequent insurance intended to be placed on the
latter by this clause. Yet it may well be doubted whether he
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would have been within the restriction, if not expressly named;
and for this reason only, I consider, he was named. The word
does not apply to an absolute purchaser of the property, who does
not become the assignee of the policy with the assent of the office,
for such a purchase of itself puts an end to the policy. It does
not apply to one who acquires merely a lien, or other interest by
way of mortgage, because he is not properly the assign of the in-
sured, whose interest and property have not passed to him, but
who, by virtue of his general property, has created a qualified and
special interest only, and conveyed that. Moreover, unless the
mortgagee insures for the account of the mortgagor-a case which
will be presently noticed-insurance by him is not within the mis-
chief intended to be guarded against, which is, such further insur-
ance as would lessen the interest of the insured in the preservation
of the property. If the insured can have no benefit from the sub-
sequent insurance, it can have no effect; and he can have no bene-
fit from it if procured by the mortgagee for his own account and
at his own expense.
We must, therefore, consider whether the insurance effected by
Shepard, Wright & Ripley, was subsequent insurance effected " by
the insured in this policy." And there are two events, in which I
am of opinion it is to be so treated.
In the first place, Shepard, Wright & Ripley, held a legal title.
It was competent for them to cover by insurance, not merely their
own special interest in the property, but the property itself.
Viewed as trustees, or as mortgagees, they might do so. (Lucena.
v. Crawford, 2 Bos. & Phull. N. R. 334'. Irving v. Richardson, 2
B. and Ad. 193; S. 0. 1 M. & Rob. 153; Carruthers v. S7edden,
6 Taunt. 17.)
If in point of fact they did cover the whole property, and were
in any manner authorized by the plaintiffs to do so, then in my
judgment, there was subsequent insurance made by the plaintiffs;
for it is -wholly immaterial in whose name it was done. It is the
thing, and not any particular form of doing it, which this clause
was intended to guard against, and that thing is such subsequent
insurance on the property as would lessen the interest of the in-
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sured in its preservation; and this includes all subsequent insur-
ance, which, when recovered, will go to the benefit of the insured
in the first policy. And so if the mortgagees did in fact cover their
own special interest as mortgagees, and the mortgagors agreed, to
pay the expense of obtaining the insurance, then, although the
mortgagees would have a lien on the insurance money as security
for their debt, yet the mortgagors could compel its application to
the payment of the debt, and any surplus would belong to them-
selves. In these cases the subsequent insurance, being effected by
the authority of the insured,.for their benefit, and at their expense,
must be deemed to be effected by them, within the meaning of this
clause in the policy.
Whether this case comes within this interpretation of the policy,
is a question of fact for the jury. There is nothing decisive in the
instrument executed by the plaintiffs, and Shepard, Wright & Ripley.
What is there said concerning the payment for insurance, is intro-
duced as a qualification of the covenant of the lessors. It mniy be
evidence that there was some understanding between the parties on
that subject, but in itself it only qualifies the lessor's covenant. So
the testimony of Ripley, though it proves the insurance money is
now intended to be credited hereafter to the plaintiffs, does not
enable the Court to say that the insurance affected by them was
for account of the plaintiffs. I shall submit to the jury, the ques-
tions of fact, in substance as follows:-
If the insurance obtained by Shepard, Wright & Ripley, nomi-
nally covered the whole property, and not merely their interest in
it, and they were in any manner authorized by the plaintiffs so to
insure, or if there was any agreement between- the plaintiffs and
Shepard, Wright & Ripley, that the former would pay the cost of
insuring that special interest of Shepard, Wright & Ripley, or -any
part of it, then there was subsequent insurance within the meaning
of this policy, and the plaintiffs cannot recover.
Carpenter Lences, for Plaintiffs.
Annes .& Bradley, for Defendants.
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Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, May 1852.
MARY HEADLEY VS. ANN KIRBY.
1. A gift of all the donor's property, in prospect of death is a will, not a donatio
causa mortis. It is not valid unless executed either as a written or as nuncupa-
tive will.
2. In support of an alleged donatio mortis causa, the evidence was, that the dece-
dent said,, in extremis to the donee, "Ann, I am dying; all I have is with you, and
all is yours; do what you can for me; there are my keys." The decedent had
then in her room two trunks, one containing clothing, and the other a non-
negotiable note, and a deposite book with a saving fund society, and other articles.
The beneficiary thereupon took the keys, which were hanging at the bed-side, in
the presence of the donor. Held, that the Court below erred in permitting the
evidence to go to the jury.
3. Cases of donations mortis causa, are exceptions, not to be extended by way of
analogy.
Error from the District Court of Philadelphia.
This was an action of replevin brought by the plaintiff, as admi-
nistratrix of Patience Kirby, deceased, to recover from the de-
fendant certain articles of wearing apparel, some jewelry and plate,
a note for $1,600, payable on demand, but not negotiable, and a
book of deposit in the Philadelphia Saving Fund Society: all of
which had been the property of the decedent. The defence was,
that these articles had been given to the defendant as a donatio
mortis causa.
On the trial of the case, the following facts were, in substance,
proved:-
Patience Kirby, the deceased, had, a few days before her death,
come to the residence of the defendant, who was her sister-in-law,
but with whom however she had not been previously on terms of
intimacy, bringing with her all her property, which was personalty,
and had rented two rooms, at a small sum a week. Some of the
articles which were the object of suit, were contained in two trunks,
one about eighteen inches long, in -which were the note and deposit
book, and some other matters; others were placed in a band-box, or
hung up in a closet. The decedent, shortly after her arrival, being
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taken suddenly ill, was found by members of the family who came
in to her assistance; half raised in her bed, she told them she was
dying, and asked to be lifted up, which was done by the defendant.
She then said to the latter, according to the witnesses for the de-
fence, "Ann, I am dying, all I have is with you, and all is yours,
do what you can for me, there are my keys;" or words of similar
purport. The defendant thereupon laid her down and took the keys,
which hung at the side of the dressing-glass, close by the bed, in
her presence, and 'put them in her pocket; the decedent was said
to have been perfectly calm and sensible at the tim6, but died in a
few minutes. After her death, the defendant opened the trunks,
and took possession of the effects, claiming them at first, as under
a nuncuvative will, but bein4 advised that it was ineffectual as such,
and failing subsequently to get administration, then as a gift mortis
eausa.
In rebuttal, witnesses for the plaintiff testified that the defendant,
and one of the witnesses, had repeated the words relied' on as
creating a gift, shortly after Patience's death, in this form. "Ann,
I am dying, everything is with you, have everything done for me."
It was also offered to show that there had been a want of affection
on the part of the decedent towards the defeiadant, and that she
had, in fact, often expressed her dislike to her; but the testimony
was rejected as irrelevant.
It must be also remarked, in regard to the deposit book, that the
seventh of the rules of the Saving Fund, which rules depositors
are obliged to sign, provides that no check or order for the payment
of money shall be accepted; and that no transfer or assignment of
the money belonging to a depositor shall be recognized. In case
of the death of any depositor, payment is to be made only to the
executors or administrators, unless some person be appointed during
the lifetime of the depositor, in a book kept upon the office, or
some disposition be made of the deposit by will.
The defendant's counsel then requested the charge of the Court
to the Jury upon the following points submitted by them in writing.
1. If the goods and chattels mentioned in the declaration were
secured under locks and keys, and were given by the deceased to
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the defendant, the delivery of the keys is a sufficient delivery of
the articles in order to constitute a valid donatio mortis causa.
2. If the deceased at the time of the gifts parted with all
dominion over them, it is sufficient to render the gifts valid as
donationes mortis causa.
3. A note of a third party payable to deceased, is a proper sub-
ject of a donatio mortis causa.
4. The book in which is entered an acknowledgment of money
deposited as a loan with the Philadelphia Saving Fund Society,
such acknowledgment being in the handwriting of the offiber of the
Company, is an evidence of -debt which may be a proper subject of
a donatio mortis causa; a delivery of the book is a sufficient de-
livery by which the right to the money loaned may pass.
The learned Judge charged the jury, that if the facts related
by defendant's witnesses were believed by the jury, they were
sufficient to establish a valid donatio mortis causa.-" The question
for the jury would be," he said, '.' did the decedent use words suffi-
cient to declare her intention to give all her property to the de-
fendant, and if so, did she do so under the immediate expectation
of death, and that she died a few minutes afterwards, is not in dis-
pute. If so, the gift is valid as a donatio mortis causa. These
are questions for the jury. The defendant's 1st, 2d, and 8d points
are correct. The fourth point I negative, but reserve the point for
the Court in bane." The plaintiff's counsel thereupon excepted.
The jury having found for the defendant, the Court subsequently
gave judgment for her upon the point reserved, declaring that the
gift of the said book of account and deposit was sufficient to pass
the money as a valid donatio mortis causa. To which opinion the
counsel'of the plaintiff also excepted.
The rejection of the evidence as to the state of feeling of the
decedent towards the defendant, the answers of theCourt to the points
proposed, and the charge of the Court were assigned for error.
Mr. SHEPPARD -and Mr. MERIDETH, for the plaintiff in error,
cited Wells v. Tucker, 3 Binn. 870; Yarnell's Will, 4 R.- 62;
.Duffield v. .Flwees, I Dow. P. C. N. S. 1; Prince v. .fazleton, 2
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Johns, 502; Harris v. lark, 3 Comst. 121; Ward v. Turner,
2 Yes. 431; Nicholas v. Adams, 2 Wh. 17; Bedges v. Hedges,
Prec. Ch. 269 ; Shargold v. Shargold, 2 Yes. 431 ; Irons v. Small-
piece, 2 B. & Ald. 551; McDowell v. Alurdock, 1 N. & M. 237;
Meadows v. Mitchell, 1 Murphy, 127; Sims v. Walker, 8 Humph.
503; Bunn v. Markham, 7 Taunt. 224; Gratton v. Appleton, 8
Story, 755; Smith v. Smith, Str. 955; Jones v. Shelby, Prec. Ch.
800; Hawkins v. Blewitt, 2 Esp. 663; _iddel v. Dobree, 10 Sim.
244 ; Miller v. Jeff-ries, 4 Gratt. 472; Miller v. Miller, 3 P. Wins.
856; Bradley v. H~unt, 5 G. & J. 45; Gardner v. Parker, 3
Maid. 182 ; Harris v. Clark, 2 Barb. Sup. C. 94: 3 Com. 121 ;
Tate v. Hilburt, 2 Yes. jr. 111.; Tafnell v. Constable, 8 Sim. 69;
-Edwards v. Jones, 1 M. & C. 226; Batten on Contract, p. 40;
Bryson v. Browning, 9 Yes. jr. 4; Manderville v. Welsh, 5
Wheat 285; Pennington v. Gitting, 2 G. & J. 210.
Mr. MANN and Mr. BRIGHTLY, for the defendants in error, cited,
Toller on Ex'rs., 233. Inst. lib; I. tit. 7; 2 Domat, 93, 475; 2
P. L. J. 50 ; Harris v. Clark, 3 Comst. 113 ; Jones v. Selby, Prec.
Ch, 300; Smith v. Smith, Str. R. 955; Ward v. Turner, 2 Yes.
431; Wilkes v. Ferris, 5 Johns. 535; Miller v. Jeffries, 4 Gratt.
479; Chevalier v. WTilson, 1 Texas, 171; Bradley v. Hunt, 5 G.
& J. 54; Wells v. Tucker, 3 Binn. 366; Gardner v. Parker, 3
Madd. 185; 1 Lead. Cas. Eq. 617; Soutant v. Schuyler, 1 Paige,
316, 318; Holley v. Adams, 16 Yerm. 206, 211; Grover v.
Grover, 24 Pick. 261, 264, 266; Borneman v. Borneman, 15
Maine, 429 ; 19 Ibid. 225; 21 Ibid. 185; Brown v. Brown, 18 Conn.
410, 413; Parrish v. Stone, 14 Pick. 198, 204-5 ; Harris v.'Clark,
2 Barb., S. C. 94, 98; Miller v. Miller, 3 P. Wins. 356; Hill v.
Chapman, 2 Bro. C. C. 612; Drury v. Smith, 1 P. Wins. 404;
G-old v. _utland, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 346; Jones v. Selby, Pree. Oh.
300; Duffield v. .Elwes, 1 Bligh's N. R. 514; Dow v. Hicks, 1
Dow. & Clark, 1.
*May 15th, 1852. The opinion of the Court was delivered by
LowRIE, J.-Though we derive the law as to donationes mortis
causa from the Roman lawyers, yet their rules on that subject are no
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guide to us in the administration of our law; for the stringent
severity against their law of wills, occasioned and excused larger
equitable exceptions by way of gifts in prospect of death, than
can at all be sanctioned under our much more reasonable sta-
tute of wills. But even with them, these gifts were so carefully
guarded, that however they might infringe upon the rules as to tes-
tamentary dispositions, they could not readily give rise to fraud,
for every such gift was invalid unless proved by five witnesses, pre-
sent at the time, every one of whom was required to be a Roman
citizen, of full age, of good character, and not related to either
donor or donee, a regulation not belonging to our law of evidence.
In the Roman law (Just. 2, 7, 1; 2 Domat. 4, 1, 3, 2-6,) as
well as in our own, (2 Yes. jr. 120 ; 2 Swanst, 98) these donations
are regarded as of the same nature as testamentary dispositions,
and such is manifestly their character. We shall therefore take
but a one-sided view of such gifts, if in considering them, we
neglect the spirit of our law of wills; and it is not necessary here
to point out the care which some courts have taken to prevent this
exception to the law of wills from making any further invasion upon
that law.
So far as regards, property, a will is the declaration of one's
intention as to the disposition of it after his death; and our law on
that subject is very clear in defining the form of such a will. Con-
sidering that our present statute is substantially a mere repetition of
the law as it has existed ever since 19 Charles 2, it is perhaps, too
late to attempt, without legislative direction, to reclaim it from the
exceptions which have been made in favor of these donations; but
we may, and must restrain the effect of those exceptions, so as to
prevent them from becoming themselves a general rule.
The gift in the case before us proposes to embrace all the donor's
property, and to be made in prospect of death, and is therefore a
will, if it receive the sanction of law. The claim that such a thing
can be, is a startling consequence of the exceptions in favor of
donationes mortis causa; and it is not possible to say that such a
consequence may not be arrived at if we follow the analogies of
those exceptions without looking at our statute, and without regard-
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ing the maxim, quod contra rationem juris receptum est non est
producendum ad consequentia.
This case is so entirely peculiar in its character, that if we take
our statute of wills as the general rule for such dispositions, as we
are bound to do, and .treat cases of donatione8 mostis causa as
exceptions which are not to be extended by way of analogy, then
we are clear of all embarrassment as to the principle on which the
case is to be decided. It is not pretended that any gift like this
has ever been held good, and it may be safely declared that no
mere gift made in prospect of death, and professing to pass all one's
property to another, to take effect after death, can be valid under
our statute of wills, no matter what delivery may have accompanied
it. If this is not true, then it is plain that the statute of wills, so
far as it is intended to exclude all modes of disposing of personal
property at death, which it does not provide for, is repealed by the
decisions of the courts.
It is not necessary to point out the danger of sustaining such a
donation as this, for no thinking mind can fail to see it; and it was
this very consideration which led to the precautions which are pro-
vided in the statute on the subject of nuncupative wills. -We can-
not even glance at these precautions, without seeing that they were
designed to defeat a gift, sustained by such evidence as was given
in this case, and to prevent oral dispositions, in the nature of 'last
wills, from being made under such suspicious circumstances. The
court ought to have instructed the jury that such evidence could not
establish a donatio mortis causa, or to have ruled out the whole
evidence as insufficient.
Judgment reversed and new trial awarded.1
ew York Supreme Gourt, Albany, February 18, 1852.
JOHN COSTIGAN V. JOHN NEWLAND.
Where an agent rightfully receives money for his principal, which ought to be paid
over by the principal to a third person, such third person cannot maintain an
I See ante, page 1 ; and for a new point on the subject of this case, see Moore
v. Darton, 7 Eng. L. & E. Rep. 134.
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action against the agent for the recovery, though the agent have never in fact paid
it over to his principal, and though the agent have notice of the claim made by
such third person.
An attorney who forecloses a mortgage for his client by advertisement under the
statute of New York, and on the sale receives the amounts only which he pays over
the amount due to his client, cannot be held liable to the person having the oldest
lien on the surplus. The action in such case must be brought against the client,
and not against the attorney.
The defendant, as attorney for Lockwood Deforest, foreclosed a
mortgage against John and Andrew Delahant, by advertisement.
After paying the mortgage debt and interest and costs out of the
money arising from the sale, a surplus remained in the hands of
the defendant, amounting to $180 95. The plaintiff claimed such
surplus by reason of a judgment he had recovered against the Del-
ahants for over $2,000, which was the oldest unpaid lien on the
premises, proved on the trial; and while such surplus remained in
defendant's hands, plaintiff served notice on the defendant of his
claim, and the facts on which it was based, and demanded the
money. The defendant refused to pay, but afterwards paid the
money over to one Harrison, who claimed to be entitled to it, and
executed a bond of indemnity to the defendant.
The cause was referred to a referee, who reported in favor of the
defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.
S. Stevens, for Plaintiff.
J K. Porter. for Defendant.
PAR ER, P. J.-The defendant received the money as the attor-
ney of Deforest, for whom he transacted the business of foreclosing
the mortgage. He is therefore to be considered as the agent, and
Deforest the jrincipal, and the question presented is whether, con-
ceding that the plaintiff was entitled to the surplus, the action,
under such circumstances, can be maintained against the agent.
If the agent had a right to receive the money, and it was not
paid over by mistake, then payment to the agent "was in law eo
imtanti, payment to the principal. (1 Campbell, 337,) and in such
cases the principal, and not the agelit, is accountable for the money.
In Eden v. Bead, (3 Campbell, 139,) it appeared that Spooner
and Atwood were Bankers and Receivers General of taxes. The
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plaintiff was a collector of taxes, and brought a suit against Read
their clerk, on a receipt signed '1 for Spooner & Atwood, Win.
Read." It was held by Lord Ellenborough that the action should
have been brought against Read; and the plaintiff was nonsuited.
The case of &ephen8 v. Badcock, (8 Barn. & Ald. 354, 23 Eng.
Com. Law, 93,) is directly in point. The plaintiff was Rector of
Ludgrave; the defendant had been clerk to Samuel John, an attor-
ney whom the plaintiff had for several years employed to receive
his rents and tithes. John, being in embarrassed circumstances,
left home and never returned. After his departure and before
the cause of it was known in his office, the defendant received from
one of the plaintiff's parishioners (which he was in fact authorized
to do) the sum of £9, and gave a receipt as follows:
"Ree'd 20 Aug., 1827, of Mr. H. F. X9, for half a year's com-
position for tithes, due to Rev. J. Stevens at lady day last past.
For Mr. S. John,
John Badcock.."
At the time of this transaction, John was indebted to plaintiff
on a balance of account. It did 'not appear that John owed the
defendant. The defendant refusing to pay plaintiff the X9, as-
sumpsit was brought, and the King's bench held the action would
not lie, for the reason that the defendant received the money as
the clerk of his master, and was accountable to him for it; the
master, on the other hand, being answerable to the client for the
sum received by the clerk. This case cannot be distinguished in
principal from that under consideration. Both present the question
whether a mere agent, not acting in any official capacity, while he
acts within the scope of his authority, can be held liable, by any
other person than his principal, for money properly received by
him in the name and business of, and for the principal.
The recent case of Colvin v. ffolbroo, (2 Comst. 126) recognizes
this same principal, and must be regarded as settling the law in,
this State. It was a suit brought against a Deputy Sheriff, to
recover 3poney rightfully received by him in that character, on a
redemption of lands he had sold on execution, and which he refused
on demand, to pay over to the person to whom it belonged. The
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only question was whether the action would be against the Deputy
Sheriff; and judgment was given against the plaintiff, on the
ground that the action in such case would only lie against the
Sheriff. The court laid out of view the official character of the
defendant, and put the case on the ground most favorable to the
plaintiff, deciding only the question, whether an agent receiving
money from his principal in pursuance of a valid authority, without
fraud, duress or mistake, is liable to an action in behalf of a person
who is ultimately entitled to the money, for neglecting to pay the
same over upon request, and before it is paid over to the principal.
The Court said the rule is universal, that a known agent is not-
responsible to third persons for acts done by him in pursuance of
an authority rightfully conferred on him, and they held the prin-
cipal alone responsible.
The cases relied on by the plaintiff's counsel in this case, were
there examined and commented on by Gardner, J., and shown to be
cases where the principal had no right to receive the money, and
of course could confer none upon the agent; or where it was paid
by mistake ; or where the agent exceeded his authority and con-
sequently could not claim its protection.
There is no doubt that where money is paid to the agent by
mistake, 'or under such circumstances, that it may be recovered back
from the principal by the party paying, it may be recovered back
from the agent if he has not paid it to the principal, or altered
his situation in relation to him, (7 Cowen, 460.) But where it is.
properly paid to the agent, the party ultimately entitled can
recover only from the principal. In other words, where the, party
claims the money in affirmance of the right of the agent to receive
it for his principal, he can sue only the principal and not the agent
for the money. No case has beeA .cited, and I think none can be
found conflicting with this rule.
The defendant in this case owed no duty to the plaintiff. The
money was properly received by the defendant, and it was his duty
to pay it to Deforest, his principal. A judgment against the
defendant in this suit would not protect him against another judg-
ment in favor of Deforest. As to third persons, Deforest is re-
8
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garded as having received the money by his agent when it was paid
to the defendant, and was chargeable with the money and with
the legal consequences of receiving it, as soon as it came to the
hands of his attorney, whether the attorney ever paid it over to
his principal or not. It may be that Deforest has some legal
defence to the action. It is certain that he is better acquainted
than another person with the state of his accounts with the plaintiff.
The defendant had no individuality in the matter. It was mer-
ged in that of the principal. The defendant could not interplead
the claimants. (Cooper v. Tastet, 1 Tamlyn, 177, 5 Madd. Oh. R.
47, Story Eq. P1. sec. 296. He could neither decide the matter
for his principal, nor ask the Court to decide it for him.
The referee was therefore right in his report, and the judgment
entered therein must be affirmed.
Judgment of referee affirmed.
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, August, 1852.
M'GLENSEY VS. COX.
1. The purchaser of the interest of one of several partners has no right to interfere
personally in the affairs of the partnership, and a refusal of the remaining part-
ners to permit him to do so will not entitle him to the interference of a Court of
Equity by injunction, or the appointment of a receiver.
2, A provision in partnership articles that neither of the partners should sell or assign
his interest without consulting the other parties, and giving them the preference,
does not by implication authorize the introduction of a stranger into the firm by
one of the partners, on a refusal by the rest to purchase his share.
This was a motion for an injunction and receiver upon bill filed.
The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the Court.
THoMPSON, P. J.-The bill filed in this ease alleges that Andrew
B. Hirst, Charles D. Cox and James B. Smith entered into
partnership for the purpose of carrying on the business of the
City Hotel, on the 29th day of January, 1852; that the said
Hirst on the 16th of July, 1852, having first offered to sell his
share or interest in the partnership to his co-partners, upon
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their declining to purchase, sold his said interest to the com-
plainant, that since the said sale to complainant, the said Cox
and Smith have advertised a dissolution of the partnership, and
that they are still in possession of the partnership property, and
are endeavoring to collect the debts due the firm; and further,
that they refuse to make any equitable division or settlement with
said complainant.
Upon these charges, the bill prays for an account, and injunction
to restrain said respondents from collecting or receiving any part-
nership debts or moneys, and for the appointment of a receiver.
The affidavit read in support of the motion for the injunction,
and for the appointment of a receiver, goes further than the bill,
and alleges mismanagement of the partnership affairs and property
by the respondents. Upon the hearing of the motion, the respon-
dents presented counter affidavits, by which the charges contained
in the bill, of their refusal to account and to make an equitable
settlement, as well as the allegation of mismanagement rontained in
the complainant's affidavit, are fully and positively denied. The
respondents further show by their affidavits, that they requested
the complainant to unite with them in taking an account of the
partnership affairs, and that upon his refusal to do so, they are
now proceeding to ascertain the value of the assets of the partner-
ship for the purpose of adjusting and settling the interests of the
respective parties.
Upon the case, therefore, as presented upon the affidavits of the
respective parties, the complainant is not entitled to an injunction.
All the allegations made by the complainant are fully responded
to, and his equity denied.
But it is insisted by the complainant, that inasmuch as he is a pur-
chaser of the interest of Hirst, one of the partners, he is entitled,
upon the dissolution which has taken place, to have a receiver
appointed as a matter of course, even though all improper conduct
on the part of the respondents has been denied, or did not in fact
exist.
It is not necessary to consider in this case, whether a partner
who by his own act dissolves the partnership before the expiration
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of the term fixed for its continuance, can claim to have a receiver
appointed, without alleging a breach of duty or of the partnership
contract on the part of his co-partner, as the complainant does not
claim to come into the firm as a partner, nor does his assignor,
Hirst, appear in any way a party to the suit.
. The ground assumed by the complainant is, that the partnership
having been dissolved, whether by the sale to him or by the notice
given by the respondents subsequent to said sale, it matters not
which, it is the ordinary case of a dissolved partnership, and that
he, as the party in interest, is entitled to have an injunction and a
receaver as a matter of course.
.Whatever may be the rights of a partner upon the dissolution, it
i clear that he cannot transfer to a stranger his interest in the
partnership, and thereby introduce him into the concern as a part-
ner, (Mason v. Connel, 1 Whar. 881 ; Cochran v. Perry, 8 W. & S.
262;, Rorton's Appeal, 1 Harris, 67.) Can he then, by a transfer
convey to a stranger those rights which he possesses only because
he.is a partner? The stranger thus coming into the concern may
he entitled to use appropriate means to ascertain the situation of
the partnership; he may demand an account and perhaps an imme-
diate settlement, but not being a partner, he has no right person-
ally to interfere, and the refusal of the remaining partners to per-
mit him to do so, is no sufficient reason for depriving them of any
rights to which their position entitles them. The remaining part-
ners, after a dissolution thus effected, are entitled to hold possession
for the purpose of paying off the debts and winding up the assets of
the firm, (1 Harris, 67;) and in case where no improver conduct is
charged in the complainant's bill, and where everything like mis-
management is fully refuted by the counter affidavits presented,
awl where it further appeared that the complainant has had further
opportunity to investigate the situation of affairs, and to ascertain
the yalue of the interest claimed by him, it would be a harsh exer-
cise of the power of the Court to deprive parties of their rightful
control over their own property, without some more efficient cause
shown than appears in the present case.
The clause in the agreement by which the partnership was
